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THE COMMUNITY PROSECUTOR: QUESTIONS OF
PROFESSIONAL DISCRETION
Bruce A. Green*
Alafair S. Burke"

This Article examines community prosecuting from an ethics
perspective. Our focus is not on prosecutors' compliance with the
disciplinary rules, however. The strategies that have been said to
exemplify community prosecuting are almost invariably compliant
with disciplinary rules and other aspects of the law governing
prosecutors. Rather, we take a broader perspective. Our focus is on
how prosecutors exercise discretion in the context of adopting
community prosecution strategies. We examine this question from
both normative and procedural perspectives. We propose that the
addition of community-based defense lawyers could help mitigate
concerns about prosecutorial discretion in community justice
programs by broadening community participation and helping
inform the community about an array of potential solutions and
their implications.
I. BACKGROUND

A quick Google search for the term "community prosecution"
yields nearly twenty-five million hits, including descriptions of
community prosecution units in county after county across the
nation. What began as a small effort in Manhattan in 1985 was
implemented more actively in Portland and Seattle in 1990 and
1991, respectively, and community prosecution soon became a
national trend as more jurisdictions found ways to implement its
principles.' By 2003, the American Prosecutors Research Institute
("APRI") estimated that nearly half of all prosecutors' offices
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1. History of Community Prosecution, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/bja/commpros/bjal.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012)

(showing chronology of community-based prosecution efforts).
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engaged in activities that constituted community prosecution. 2
Generous federal grant funding supported the efforts. 3
Despite the prevalence and popularity of community
prosecution, its definition still remains hazy.4 Perhaps the one point
of agreement is that community prosecutors have implemented the
lessons of community policing into a prosecution model.5
Accordingly, the starting point for understanding the current state
of community prosecution, and contrasting it with traditional
prosecution models, is an understanding of community policing and
the distinction between it and traditional policing.

A.

Outgrowth of Community Policing

Traditional policing in the last half of the twentieth century6
was marked by a reactive, rapid-response model of policing.7 In
2. M. ELAINE NUGENT, AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., WHAT DOES IT
MEAN TO PRACTICE COMMUNITY PROSECUTION? 4 (2004).

3. History of Community Prosecution, supra note 1 (documenting federal
funding distributed in the late 1990s and early 2000s to support the

development, continuation, and growth of community-based prosecution
efforts).

4. See, e.g., M. ELAINE NUGENT ET AL., AM.
THE

NATURE

PROSECUTORS],

OF

PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST.,

COMMUNITY PROSECUTION VS.
TRADITIONAL PROSECUTION APPROACHES 3-4 (2004) [hereinafter THE CHANGING
NATURE OF PROSECUTION] (describing prosecutors' differing understandings and
uses of the term); Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 323 (2002) ("It is not at all obvious ... what the term
'community prosecution' actually means.").
5. AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DIV.,
COMMUNITY PROSECUTION: A GUIDE FOR PROSECUTORS 1 (n.d.) [hereinafter GUIDE

FOR

CHANGING

PROSECUTION:

available

at

http://www.ndaa.org/pdflCommunity

%20Prosecution%20guide.pdf ("Community prosecution has derived some of its
basic elements from community policing (i.e. directly engaging with community
residents; responding proactively to crime; increasing accountability to the
public; and decentralizing operations)."); NAT'L DIST. ATT'Ys AsS'N & NAT'L CTR.
FOR CMTY. PROSECUTION, KEY PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROSECUTION 3-4
(2009) [hereinafter KEY PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROSECUTION], available at
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/final-key-principles-updatedjan 2009.pdf;
Russ
Freyman, D.A.s in the Streets, GOVERNING, Sept. 1998, at 28, 28 (noting that
community prosecution derived from community policing).

6. Early forms of policing in the United States did focus more on ordermaintenance than reactive, investigatory crime control. See George L. Kelling

& Mark H. Moore, From Political to Reform to Community: The Evolving
Strategy of Police, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 3, 3-11 (Jack

R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988) (noting law enforcement's shift
during the twentieth century from a focus on social welfare work toward a
prioritization of crime control); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the

Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing,97
COLUM. L. REV. 551, 565-73 (1997) (documenting historical trends in American
policing).

7. Mark H. Moore & George L. Kelling, "To Serve and Protect"' Learning
from Police History, PUB. INT., Winter 1983, at 49, 60; Thompson, supra note 4,
at 338-39.
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reactive policing, it is a crime's occurrence that triggers police
Police then investigate, seeking to identify the
involvement.
perpetrator and to gather evidence with an eye toward prosecuting
and punishing the offender. When law enforcement focuses on
reactive case creation, each law enforcement actor plays a separate
role-police investigate after a crime has occurred, prosecutors join
in after an arrest to represent the government in adjudication, and
corrections officers step in post-conviction. 8 Police interaction with
the community is minimal as law enforcement looks to citizens only
for their assistance as victims and witnesses to help identify and
prosecute offenders. 9
Community policing emerged in the late 1970s and started to
gain momentum in the 1980s.10 It was one of law enforcement's
institutional responses to "[s]kyrocketing crime rates, riots,
accusations of racism and brutality, corruption, inefficiency," and
the public's general lack of faith in the police and the government as
a whole in the 1960s and 1970s.11 It rose in popularity in the 1990s
with governments' renewed emphasis on revitalization of cities and
reduction of crime. 12 The "bandwagon" 3 grew so quickly 4 that it
became "ubiquitous." 5

8. Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former
NeighborhoodDistrictAttorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 989 (2003).
9. Thompson, supra note 4, at 339.
10. Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Wills, Police Organization

Continuity and Change: Into the Twenty-First Century, in 39

CRIME AND

JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 55, 118 (Michael Tonry ed., 2010).

11. Id.
12. In his 1994 State of the Union Address, President Clinton vowed to
place 100,000 community-oriented police officers on America's streets.
President William Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 1994), in 30
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 148, 155-56 (1994). Within
a year, the Department of Justice created its Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services ("COPS") to accomplish that goal by expanding community
policing and distributing grant funds to support local community policing

projects.

Ted Gest, The Evolution of Crime and Politics in America, 33

McGEORGE L. REV. 759, 762 (2002).
13. WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING,
CHICAGO STYLE, at vii (1997) ("The concept [of community policing] is so popular

with the public and city councils that scarcely a chief wants his department to
be known for failing to climb on this bandwagon.").
14. Between 1997 and 1999, the number of police departments employing
community policing techniques doubled, and the number of police officers
designated as community policing officers quadrupled. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN &
BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMMUNITY POLICING IN LOCAL
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 1997 AND 1999, at 2 (rev. 2003), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cplpd99.pdf.
15. Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1593, 1593 (2002) (collecting sources evidencing that the term community
policing "has become ubiquitous among law-enforcement practitioners and
scholars").
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In contrast to traditional policing, community policing looks to
the community, not just as witnesses and victims, but as
stakeholders who help shape law enforcement's priorities and design
and implement solutions. 16 The literature on community policing
identifies three other defining characteristics, but each of these can
be seen as stemming from the defining hallmark of community
input. First, when community members are permitted to shape law
enforcement priorities and programs, it is not surprising that
community police officers hear different community concerns in
different neighborhoods. One neighborhood might be plagued by
street-level drug dealing, another by prostitution, and another by
noise caused by kids skateboarding at midnight. Accordingly,
community policing, unlike rapid-response policing, tends to adopt
strategies by intrajurisdictional, geographic distinctions, rather
than adopting a monolithic approach to the entire jurisdiction.' 7
Second, unlike traditional policing that prioritizes investigation
of serious offenses over minor ones, community-based policing tends
to focus on relatively "low-level, quality-of-life" problems.' 8 This is
because, in at least some neighborhoods, community members'
biggest complaints are about relatively minor offenses such as
graffiti, trespassing, public intoxication, and other forms of disorder.
Advocates of aggressive enforcement of relatively minor crimes often
invoke George Kelling and James Wilson's influential "broken
windows" theory, which posits that one broken window is a sign of
general lawlessness, leading to another and then others.' 9 The
appearance of disorder deters law-abiding residents from exerting
control over their neighborhoods while validating the conduct of
lawbreakers. 20 In contrast, the theory goes, police enforcement of
positive social norms will empower law-abiding residents in their

16. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows:
Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 502
(2000) (discussing the influence of community "stakeholders" in shaping police
norms); Joan W. Howarth, Toward the Restorative Constitution:A Restorative
Justice Critique of Anti-Gang Public Nuisance Injunctions, 27 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 717, 720 (2000) (observing that "stakeholder" agreement is important to
restorative justice programs).
17. Archon Fung, Beyond and Below the New Urbanism: Citizen
Participationand Responsive Spatial Reconstruction, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 615, 629 (2001) (discussing neighborhood-specific identification of
problems and solutions); Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 407, 421 (2000) ("[P]olice are accountable to neighborhoods as well as
to cities . . .").

18. Eric W. Nicastro, Confronting the Neighbors: Community Impact Panels
in the Realm of Restorative Justice and Punishment Theory, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 261, 261 (2003).
19. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31-32; Livingston, supra note 6, at 583-85

(discussing the broken windows theory's influence on contemporary policing).
20. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 19, at 31-32.
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own communities and send a message to the lawless that they are
unwelcome. 2 1
Finally, because community-based police officers are called on to
respond to low-level but common and chronic problems, the
traditional, reactive approach of investigation, arrest, and
prosecution is untenable. 22 Instead, community policing employs
Herman Goldstein's recommended approach of proactive policing,
seeking to develop long-term, preventative, programmatic responses
to recurring quality-of-life problems. 2 3 In this form of policing,
arrest and prosecution are used only as a means to an end, not for
purposes of punishment. 24
In a model of law enforcement in which prosecution is only a
means to an end, what is "community prosecution"? Prosecutors use
the term in different and, at times, contradictory ways. The vague
concept may be thought to refer to a philosophy, a strategy, or
both. 25 The concept's list of "commonly cited operational elements,"
such as prioritization of "problem-solving" and quality-of-life issues,
partnerships with community, geographic focus, and integration of
"proactive strategies," clearly shares ground with community
policing principles. 26 At the same time, however, the community
prosecution concept clearly extends-at least for some-well past
the hallmark characteristics that initially defined community
policing. Although some identify community prosecuting exclusively

21. See id. at 33. For more thorough discussions of the role of enforcement
of social norms in community policing efforts, see Dan M. Kahan, Social
Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 367-77 (1997);
Livingston, supra note 6, at 578-84; Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of
Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 377 (2001); Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops,

Community Policing,and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should
One Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1256-58
(2000).
22. Waldeck, supranote 21, at 1270-71.
23. See Heymann, supra note 17, at 423 (noting Goldstein's influence in
shifting police priorities to the prevention of crime as a primary goal);
Livingston, supra note 6, at 573-75 (discussing Goldstein's influence on
contemporary policing). See generally HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED
POLICING (1990); Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented
Approach, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 236 (1979).
24. Heymann, supra note 17, at 420 ("[Olur policing strategies in the last
decade have turned heavily towards prevention of crimes ... rather than
individual events.").
25. See, e.g., GUIDE FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 5, at 1 ("APRI defines
community prosecuting as a philosophy, as well as a strategy, involving
prosecutors focusing their resources in response to the needs of specific
communities.").
26. See id. at 5-7 (listing nine "elements critical to the success" of
community prosecution); KEY PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROSECUTION, supra

note 5, at 3-4.
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or primarily with responses to quality-of-life crimes, 27 others use it
equally to describe nontraditional responses to serious crimes such
as drug trafficking and gang violence. 28 Although some assume that
community prosecuting exclusively or primarily involves "proactive"
strategies, 29 others identify the concept with a combination of
reactive and proactive strategies.3 0 In fact, as the pliant term has
come to be used, community prosecuting is not necessarily about
Community prosecuting
either community or prosecuting.
strategies do not necessarily target particular communities 3 1although they typically dO3 2 and many of these strategies do not
include prosecuting criminal offenders.3 3
B.

Contrast with TraditionalProsecution

Community prosecuting, regardless of how it is defined, is
viewed as a departure from how prosecutors traditionally think
about and conduct their work. 34 Despite the prevalence of guilty

27. See, e.g., THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION, supra note 4, at 3
(community prosecution is an "integrated, solutions-based approach to eradicate
crime.... [It] brings prosecutors together with residents to identify quality-oflife issues (such as graffiti, vandalism, trespassing, disorderly conduct, drug
solicitation, prostitution, aggressive panhandling, etc.) in an attempt to develop
and implement long-term strategies to address community concerns").
28. See, e.g., GUIDE FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 5, at 9-10, 43 (illustrating

the concept of community prosecuting through programs aimed at violent
felons).
29. See, e.g., id. at 4 (asserting that community prosecuting "involves a
long-term, proactive partnership").
30. See, e.g., THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION, supra note 4, at 7

(Community prosecuting is commonly thought to include "[an integrated
approach involving both reactive (e.g., prosecuting crimes identified by the
police) and proactive strategies (e.g., anticipatory actions aimed at addressing
problems at their root cause).").
31.

See, e.g., MICHAEL R. KUYKENDALL, AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST.,

FROM THE COURTROOM TO THE COMMUNITY: ETHICS AND LIABILITY ISSUES FOR THE

COMMUNITY PROSECUTOR 10 (2004) [hereinafter FROM THE COURTROOM TO THE

COMMUNITY] (suggesting that community prosecutors can avoid unwanted
variations "by expanding their community prosecuting initiative jurisdictionwide").
32.

See, e.g., THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION, supra note 4, at 7

(listing among commonly cited characteristics of community prosecuting the
concentration on "[a] clearly defined focus area, which has traditionally been
defined as a targeted geographic area").
33.

See, e.g., FROM THE COURTROOM TO THE COMMUNITY, supra note 31, at 9

("Neighborhood clean-ups, formation of block watches and foot patrols, and
turning on porch lights are all tools used by community prosecutors to actually
prevent crime.").
34.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION, supra note 4, at 15-16; Kay

Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1125, 1173-74 (2005)
(noting "ambivalence or hostility" in prosecutors who see community-based,
problem-solving role as beyond their traditional prosecutorial duties). However,
even the APRI concedes that "many prosecutors, policymakers, and scholars are
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pleas, most prosecutors imagine themselves as trial lawyers whose
work is centered at the courthouse.8 5 They focus attention on
whether a particular crime was committed, by whom, and what
should be done about it through the use of the criminal process, not
on broader social problems and how to solve them by employing the
full arsenal of government powers.
Their work is reactive,
commenced in response to crimes and police investigations. In the
investigative stage, prosecutors' work is most often in support of,
and ancillary to, that of the police and other investigators. They
secure search warrants, wiretap authorizations, arrest warrants, or
other court orders, or obtain documents and evidence with the aid of
the grand jury. In the prosecution stage, prosecutors decide
whether to file criminal charges or offer an alternative disposition.
They negotiate conditions of guilty pleas and serve as the state's
The traditional role involves employing
counsel at trial.
prosecutorial power to achieve criminal justice objectives:
incapacitating criminals (i.e., "putting away bad guys") and
deterring future crimes while protecting and avoiding harm to the
innocent. This necessitates the exercise of discretion,36 sometimes
on an ad hoc basis and sometimes based on preestablished office
policy. Discretionary decisions may draw on a host of factors
relating to criminal justice-such as the seriousness of the offense,
the dangerousness of the offender, the strength of the evidence, and
the availability of resources-and are essentially immune from
judicial review. 7
Community prosecuting takes prosecutors out of the courthouse
and into the community and casts them in a more proactive role.
Community prosecutors typically work with members of the
community to identify recurring, ongoing criminal justice problems
(drug dealing, graffiti, vagrancy) and then work in tandem with
community representatives and agencies to address these problems
through a project, policy, or strategy, often involving nontraditional

still at a loss to explain how community prosecution differs from traditional
prosecution." THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION, supranote 4, at 3.
35. Frank 0. Bowman, III, American Buffalo: Vanishing Acquittals and the
Gradual Extinction of the Federal Criminal Trial Lawyer, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 226, 237 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2007

/Bowman.pdf.
36. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004
Wis. L. REv. 837, 837-38 ("Few decisions prosecutors make are subject to legal
restraints or judicial review. Consequently, the key question for prosecutors
ordinarily is not whether their decisions are lawless, in the sense that a court
might overturn them, but rather whether the decisions are wise or imprudent."
(citations omitted)).
37. See id. at 877 ("[P]rosecutors must confine their decision-making
criteria to a combination of resource considerations and policy considerations
that drive the justifications for punishment.").
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methods. 38
Some community prosecuting activities engage
prosecutors in such extralegal pursuits as community education; 39
others involve responses to criminal conduct, including, but not
exclusively, quality-of-life crimes and other low-level crimes,
through mechanisms aside from arrest and prosecution; 40 and still
other examples involve the use of criminal justice authority in ways
that exploit information from, or relationships with, the
community. 41
While a prosecutor's office may include one or more lawyers who
are designated as community prosecutors, this work supplements
the ordinary work of a prosecutor's office. 42 Many prosecutors'
offices do not consciously engage in community prosecuting at all,
and as far as we know, none engage exclusively in community
prosecuting. 43 The first order of priority for prosecutors' offices is
the bread-and-butter work of processing, investigating, and
prosecuting felony cases, or what Portland, Oregon prosecutor
Michael Schrunk calls "taking care of business," by which he means

38. GUIDE FOR PROSECUTORS, supra note 5, at 1 ("The community
prosecution approach is proactive and views community residents and law
enforcement as partners in maintaining public safety."). In 1995, APRI adopted
the following definition: "Community prosecution focuses on targeted areas and
involves a long-term, proactive partnership among the prosecutor's office, law
enforcement, the community and public and private organizations, whereby the
authority of the prosecutor's office is used to solve problems, improve public
safety and enhance the quality of life in the community." Id. at 4.
39. E.g., id. at 27 (describing Milwaukee's "education and prevention effort
to teach the public about the criminal justice system, particularly courts and
drug-case processing"); id. at 41 (describing a Manhattan youth education
program "to educate elementary, junior high, and high school students about
the criminal justice system").
40. E.g., id. at 32 (describing a Jackson County, Missouri, prosecutor's
creation of a drug court "to allow first-time substance abuse offenders charged
with lesser drug felonies to receive substance abuse treatment in lieu of
prosecution and prison time"); id. at 35 (describing a Jackson County, Missouri,
prosecutor's project to identify close residential and commercial buildings that
were sites of drug activity through "controlled buys, search warrants, health
and fire code inspections, property owner notification, evictions, civil abatement
and forfeiture actions"); id. at 44 (describing Manhattan prosecutors' use of
obscure civil law to evict drug dealers from residential apartment buildings).
41. E.g., id. at 10 (describing programs of Philadelphia District Attorney's
Office aimed at drug trafficking, including a program whereby selected cases
were transferred to the federal authorities to be prosecuted under tougher
federal criminal laws and a program "focusing intense prosecution efforts on a
single police district"); id. at 43 (describing a Manhattan program in which
information is gathered from specific neighborhoods to facilitate prosecutions of
gang leaders for violent crimes); id. at 54 (describing a Multnomah County
prosecutor's policy of excluding individuals arrested for drug offenses from
areas defined as "Drug-Free Zones" and arresting those who entered these
areas for trespassing).
42. NUGENT, supra note 2, at 15-16.
43. Id. at 27.
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prosecuting murderers, rapists, and other serious criminals. 44 This
engages much or most of an office's time and resources. Community
prosecuting is, in most cases, an add-on-indeed, one that may be
eliminated if funding is reduced. Thus, community prosecuting does
not involve a rejection of the traditional role and responsibilities so
much as an expansion of them.
The activities said to comprise community prosecuting seem to
reflect a broader philosophy of prosecuting than the traditional one.
Community prosecuting enlarges the prosecutor's role, emphasizing
and calling attention to the prosecutor's status as a public official, as
opposed to merely a courtroom lawyer or advocate for the state in
criminal adjudication. The community prosecutor is more like the
Community
mayor than the public's criminal trial lawyer.
but
courthouse
the
outside
only
not
the
prosecutor
takes
prosecuting
processing
of
role
outside the conventional "administrative"
individual cases. 45 The prosecutor's object of concern goes beyond
criminal justice. The prosecutor may deal with vagrancy, drawing
graffiti on private and public property, and drug use not as criminal
problems but as social issues, as might officials of departments of
homelessness, sanitation, and public health. This typically requires
the adoption of proactive policies as distinguished from ad hoc
reactions to individual cases.
Evern when serving a decidedly lawyerly role, community
prosecutors try to develop "integrated, solutions-based" approaches
to crime. 46 For example, community prosecutors might work to draft
and implement ordinances to authorize police to engage in earlier,
more discretionary intervention in quality-of-life crimes and general
disorder. 47 Portland's celebrated community prosecution unit, for
instance, responded to neighborhood complaints about high
concentrations of drug offenses with a "drug-free zone" ordinance
that permitted police officers to banish suspected offenders from the
targeted safety zone. 4 8 Offenders who violated the order of exclusion
were subject to arrest for criminal trespass. 49 In the name of
community, laws have also been passed to regulate sitting or lying

FROM THE COURTROOM TO THE COMMUNITY, supra note 31, at 13.
45. With regard to prosecutors' administrative role, see generally Rachel E.

44.

Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1332 (2008), and Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of
CriminalJustice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
46. THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION, supra note 4, at 3.
47.

For a general discussion of laws targeting low-level offenses, see Robert

C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers,
Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1217-19 (1996), and
Schragger, supra note 21, at 378 (discussing laws targeting low-level offenses).
48. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE §§ 14B.20.010-.070 (2002) (creating "drug
free zones" from which drug offenders can be excluded).
49. Id. § 14B.20.035.
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on sidewalks,50 sleeping and eating in parks,5 ' panhandling, 52 and
juvenile curfews.53 Community prosecutors may then be called upon
to process the cases that arise from the new policing, often with
alternative approaches, such as community-based courts. 54
Prosecutors are traditionally independent of, if not isolated
from, public officials and agencies other than criminal law
enforcement agencies, such as the police, and are equally removed
from the public.55 Community prosecuting implies less autonomy
and more interaction with other officials and public representatives
in order to deal with criminal and social problems in a more
comprehensive manner. 56 Collaboration with other public agencies
may be useful either because the prosecutor is willing to employ
prosecutorial powers toward noncriminal objectives or because the
prosecutor seeks to commandeer noncriminal powers to prevent or
deter crime or achieve other criminal justice objectives. Interaction
with the community may both assist the prosecution in identifying
problems and provide an ally in the prosecution's efforts to deter,
investigate, or prosecute criminal activity.
Community prosecuting also implies both a less abstract idea of
Traditional
public accountability and greater transparency.
prosecutors, like judges, expect to work in accordance with
professional expectations, not particular public expectations; in fact,
they often stand as buffers against the popular hue and cry.
Prosecutors may announce arrests, indictments, and convictions,
but they traditionally do not publicly justify discretionary decisions
or publicly announce and explain their internal policies.57 The
community prosecutor, however, is accountable in a more concrete,
geographically confined sense, and is more open, since the success of

50. See Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 302-06 (9th Cir. 1996)
(upholding a Seattle ordinance prohibiting sitting or lying on sidewalks).
51. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1562-84 (S.D. Fla.
1992) (enjoining enforcement against the homeless of prohibitions against
sleeping and eating in public).
52. See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 701-06 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting loitering for the purpose of
begging); Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging To Differ: The First
Amendment and the Right To Beg, 104 HARv. L. REV. 896, 896 n.5 (1991)
(summarizing laws regulating and prohibiting panhandling).
53. See generally Brian Privor, Dusk 'Til Dawn: Children's Rights and the
Effectiveness of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415 (1999)
(discussing juvenile curfews).
54. THE CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION, supra note 4, at 22.

55. See John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and
Comparative Account, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3,

8-9 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008).
56. Community Prosecution:Key Dimensions, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE,

https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/bjalcommpros/bja2.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).

57. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and
the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 443 (2001).
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community prosecuting strategies often depends on publicizing them
and obtaining the community's support for them. Normatively,
community prosecuting implies that community representatives'
perceived interests deserve consideration, whether in the
development of prosecutorial policies or in the ad hoc exercise of
discretion in individual cases, and that the relevant normative
expectations are not exclusively those implicit in legislation, in the
history of the office, or in the prosecutor's own professional
philosophy.
II. PROSECUTORLAL DISCRETION AND COMMUNITY PROSECUTING
When it comes to exercising discretion in the course of
prosecutors' traditional work, conventional understandings or
principles have developed over time. 8 Rooted in the objectives of
the criminal justice process, these understandings are broadly, if not
universally, shared, and are communicated in various ways within
prosecutors' offices and among prosecutors of different offices.
These understandings do not dictate particular outcomes in
particular cases, but do channel prosecutors' decision making and
provide benchmarks against which the public can judge prosecutors'
actions. Community prosecution strategies may be inconsistent
with ordinary principles regarding how prosecutors should employ
their discretion, and the departures may not be sufficiently justified
by the social utility of these strategies. We explore these concerns in
the context of a story that is loosely drawn from a twenty-year-old
Pennsylvania state court decision.5 9 We offer the story to suggest
both how the insights of community prosecuting may broaden
decision making in prosecutors' traditional work and how
community prosecuting may lead to unjustified departures from
traditional principles of prosecutorial discretion.
The story is set in Delaware County in the southeast corner of
Pennsylvania in the late 1980s. As it remains today, the county was
mostly rural and mostly white, except for the City of Chester, which
was working class and populated mostly by people of color, most of
whom were black. The story is of a simple drug deal, like those that
occurred many times daily in Chester and other cities throughout
the United States.
One evening, three coworkers at a local manufacturing company
decided to try to purchase some cocaine. They were recreational
drug users and had never before been arrested. They knew of a
place in Chester near a bar where drugs could be bought quickly and

58. Catherine M. Coles, Evolving Strategies in 20th-Century American
Prosecution, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note

55, at 177, 182 (explaining how prosecutors developed standards and strategies
for handling cases throughout the 20th century).
59. Commonwealth v. Agnew, 600 A.2d 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
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easily. The police knew the spot, too, but it was poorly lit, and drug
sellers could get away by dashing into the bar or into an apartment
above it if they were spotted. The three white men in a Toyota were
noticeable in a neighborhood comprised primarily of racial
minorities and attracted the attention of plain-clothed surveillance
officers sitting in unmarked police cars who knew that there was no
commerce in the area and no reason for the men to be there except
to buy drugs. The officers observed two black men approach the car
and complete what appeared to be a drug sale, then followed the
Toyota back to the company parking lot, where the officers arrested
the three men and retrieved two plastic bags of cocaine from the
floor of the car. One of the men claimed both bags were his.
The police brought the case to the Delaware County prosecutor,
who then had to decide whether to bring charges and whether to
offer the three men some kind of deal. There were various options.
The men might be charged with purchasing drugs, conspiring to
purchase drugs, 'and/or drug possession. The prosecutor could
choose not to file any charges, to file only certain of the possible
charges, or to offer to defer bringing charges for a period of time,
during which the men would be required to avoid any further drug
use or other criminal conduct. Another possibility was to offer the
men admission into the state's Accelerated Rehabilitative
Disposition ("ARD") program for which first offenders with low-level
drug offenses were eligible if they would benefit from drug
rehabilitation. 60 Those who successfully completed the program
avoided a criminal record. 6 1
The traditional prosecutor would make the charging and plea
bargaining decisions based on a number of considerations, which
may or may not be codified in internal office policy. Among these
would be whether, based on the evidence, the prosecutor thought
that the defendants were guilty of a crime and, if so, whether a
crime could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt if the case went to
trial. 62 One conventional understanding is that prosecutors should
not bring charges unless they are personally convinced of the
defendants' guilt-although there is no consensus on the requisite
level of conviction. 63 Another is that prosecutors should not initiate
60. 234 PA. CODE §§ 300-320 (2000).
61. Id. §§ 319-320.
62. MARC L. MILLER &RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 1129 (4th
ed. 2011).
63. See generally Alafair S. Burke, ProsecutorialAgnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 79, 84-86, 91-99 (2010) (noting the general belief that prosecutors
must be personally convinced of the defendant's guilt but arguing that
prosecutors should strive for agnosticism); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky,
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 467, 497-501 (2009) (describing alternative approaches that
prosecutors might take to the question of how convinced they must be of a
defendant's guilt); Recommendation for Dismissal at 4, People v. Strauss-Kahn,
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or continue charges unless there is some possibility or likelihood of
securing a conviction-although there is no consensus on how
likely. 64
Beyond that, prosecutors may offer more lenient
resolutions in cases where they are worried about the ability to win
at trial.
Other considerations relate to whether particular punishment
would fit the crime and whether the ends of the criminal process can
be adequately served without a conviction or imprisonment. Is
incapacitation needed to keep the public safe or to deter future
lawbreakers, or are there less harsh ways to prevent the offender
and others from committing future crimes? Prosecutors generally
agree that not all offenders should be prosecuted and that offenders
should be treated in proportion to the magnitude of their
wrongdoing and their dangerousness. 65 For example, prosecutors
typically treat murderers more harshly than shoplifters, treat
willful and venal offenders more harshly than negligent offenders,
and treat repeat offenders more harshly than one-time offenders.6 6
Another commonly held principle is that similarly situated offenders
should be treated similarly, and not treated more or less harshly
Given two men who
because of irrelevant considerations. 6 7

No. 02526/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011), ("[Flor generations, before
determining whether a case should proceed to trial, felony prosecutors in New
York County have insisted that they be personally convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, and believe themselves able to prove
that guilt to a jury. . . . If, after careful assessment of the facts, the prosecutor is
not convinced that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he or she
must decline to proceed."), available at http://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/238252-motion-to-dismiss-dominique-strauss-kahn-case.html.
64. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND
("A
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]
prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued
pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to
support a conviction."); FRANK W. 1ILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO
CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 35 (1970) ("[P]rosecutors are not willing to
devote resources to charging merely because the law would permit them to do
so. Instead they insist that the evidence be of a nature that conviction is very
likely to follow.").
65. Cf. ABA STANDARDS, supranote 64, § 3-3.9(b)(ii)-(iii) (listing "the extent
of the harm caused by the offense" and "the disproportion of the authorized
punishment in relation to the particular offense or the offender" among factors
relevant to the decision to prosecute).
66. Cf. id.; UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.420 (2011) (advising
federal prosecutors to consider the defendant's criminal history and the "nature
and seriousness of the offense" in evaluating the propriety of a plea bargain),

available

at

http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousalfoia-reading-roomusam/title9/27mcrm
.htm#9-27.420.

67. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26
URB. L.J. 607, 634 (1999) ("[1Most would agree... [that the
prosecutor should] treat lawbreakers with rough equality; that is, similarly
situated individuals should generally be treated in roughly the same way.");
FORDHAM
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committed the same crime, have the same criminal history, and
have all other relevant characteristics and attributes in common, it
would ordinarily be regarded as an abuse of discretion to charge one
but not the other for no reason or based on an irrelevant reason,
such as that they have different lawyers or that one is better
connected. 68 On the other hand, relevant distinctions might be
taken into account. For example, that one was employed and the
other unemployed might be relevant to the likelihood of recidivism.
It is also understood that law enforcement and administrative
interests might be given weight. 69 Individuals may be given
leniency without regard to their culpability and dangerousness to
serve such interests. For example, a mob hit man might be given
leniency in exchange for testifying against members of the mob.
Arguably, individuals may also be treated more harshly than
otherwise deserved or expected in order to serve law enforcement
interests. 70 Many defendants who plead guilty are offered more
lenient treatment than if they stand trial71 : whether this means
treating those who plead guilty leniently to promote administrative
efficiency and spare witnesses or treating those who stand trial with
disproportionate harshness is subject to debate.
In the case of the three men arrested for buying cocaine in
Chester, the Delaware County prosecutor was disinclined to dismiss
the charges. 7 2 The evidence would have seemed strong, given the
officers' observations and the discovery of the cocaine. The question
for the prosecutor was whether to invite the men either to enter the
ARD program as an alternative to facing trial or to plead guilty to
one or more of the possible charges. 73 In cases involving offenders in
the county who purchased small amounts of cocaine for their
recreational use, the Delaware prosecutor's ordinary practice was to

Press Release, Ala. Dist. Att'ys Ass'n (Sept. 17, 2007), available at
(defending
http:/Iblog.al.com/bn/2007/09/das--group-issues-responseto_a.html
a district attorney "for trying to ensure that similarly-situated defendants are
treated similarly" in response to the state attorney general's attack on a district
attorney who agreed that an accomplice to homicide should not receive the
death penalty after the triggerman was held ineligible for the death penalty
because of his age).
68. See M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, Performance Measures and
Accountability, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra
note 55, at 91, 99-100.
69. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 1243, 1256-58 (2011); Lynch, supra note 45, at 2140-41.
70. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, "Package" Plea Bargaining and the
Prosecutor's Duty of Good Faith, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 507 (1989) (discussing
scenarios in which prosecutors seek to induce defendants to plead guilty in
exchange for leniency to family members who might not ordinarily be
prosecuted but for prosecutors' interest in obtaining leverage).
71. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 62, at 1108.
72. Commonwealth v. Agnew, 600 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
73. Id.
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offer the defendants entry into the ARD program and to prosecute
them on drug charges if they declined. There was nothing in the
nature of the men's background or conduct that called for harsher
treatment.
The Delaware County prosecutor might have come under
criticism for allowing the men into the ARD program, however, not
so much for the particular resolution but for the overall approach to
drug crimes that it would have exemplified. This approach, typical
of how prosecutors traditionally exercise discretion, 74 would have
been narrow, ad hoc, and reactive. The resolution of the individual
case would seemingly have failed to account for the magnitude of
drug problems in the City of Chester. By the late 1980s, the city
had become a magnet for open drug sales, which led to drug-related
Drug buyers flocked from
violence and property crimes.
If the defendants were allowed into the
surrounding areas.
rehabilitation program, the release of these young white men and
others like them, whose demand for drugs had helped turn parts of
Chester into an open-air drug market, might have been viewed by
city residents as an expression of indifference to the local problem.
The prosecutor's ad hoc approach to drug arrests would not have
been perceived as part of a serious prosecutorial, law enforcement,
or general public strategy to deal with the drug problem in Chester;
if prosecutorial discretion was being exercised in service of such a
strategy, the public would not have known.
In fact, the prosecutor did not take the traditional, ad hoc
approach. The prosecutor implemented a nonpublic internal policy
under which low-level drug offenders arrested in the City of Chester
were categorically excluded from the ARD program. The policy was
meant to target the city as a high-crime area. In the actual case, the
prosecutor was not acting consciously as a "community prosecutor";
the decision predated the first explicit "community prosecution"
Nonetheless, one can reimagine the prosecutor's
programs. 76
decision, and the policy on which it was based, as the product of
The
community prosecuting and not traditional prosecuting.
imaginative retelling underscores some of the potential ethical
problems that may arise in community prosecuting.
In our fictional account, the Chester County prosecutor
regarded himself as a community prosecutor, not a traditional
He recognized that Chester was different from
prosecutor.
surrounding areas of the county in that it was plagued by drug
crimes and the attendant violence. He met with business owners,
teachers, clerics, and others at town hall meetings in Chester, as
well as with the police and public officials, to understand how
74. Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1971).
75. See History of Community Prosecution, supra note 1 (showing

chronology of community-based prosecution).
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community representatives and other agencies perceived the
problem, what they expected from the prosecutor and other public
officials, and whether the community was willing to assist.
Afterward, the prosecutor responded by adopting an official zerotolerance policy for the city of Chester. 76 Drug offenders arrested in
Chester would be ineligible for ARD, even in situations in which
drug offenders in surrounding parts of the county were routinely
allowed into the program.
Under the zero-tolerance policy, the three men were required
either to stand trial on charges that were difficult to defend or plead
guilty to a criminal charge. Although the men were unlikely to be
sentenced to imprisonment even if convicted, a conviction would
carry a permanent stigma and a host of "collateral" legal
consequences, impeding their future ability to obtain jobs, loans, and
other opportunities.
The ethical problem, as some would see it, is that the policy is
unfair to individuals arrested in Chester for simple, low-level drug
offenses.
Denying admission to the ARD program to anyone
arrested for a drug offense in Chester, while allowing admission to
individuals with identical backgrounds arrested for identical
conduct in other parts of the county, arguably violated two
conventional normative understandings governing a prosecutor's
exercise of discretion.
First, the policy arguably violated the proportionality principle,
resulting in unduly harsh treatment of the defendants. Ordinarily,
prosecutors are expected to make individualized charging and plea
bargaining decisions based on all the relevant considerations. The
existence of the ARD program presupposes that, for some low-level,
first-time drug offenders, the proportionate disposition is to offer
treatment, rehabilitation, and the opportunity for a fresh start
rather than punishment. The prosecutor's policy foreclosed this
possibility based on the assumption that a harsher charging policy
would somehow reduce the drug trade in Chester or that the
existence of the policy would achieve other social values, such as
greater community satisfaction or cooperation with law enforcement
authorities.
Second, the policy arguably violated the equality principle, in
that similarly situated drug offenders were treated more or less
harshly depending on which side of the city line their offense
occurred. This consideration is unrelated to their culpability or
dangerousness and, thus, seems like an arbitrary basis for deciding
whether or not to pursue drug charges or instead admit individuals
into the drug rehabilitation program.
76. In Agnew, the policy was unwritten and, presumably, non-public, at
least until it was challenged. Agnew, 600 A.2d at 1267. A community
prosecutor, however, would ordinarily publicize the policy to promote both
public accountability and deterrence.
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A 2004 manual on the ethics of community prosecution noted
these potential problems 7 7 and offered two unsatisfactory responses.
The first was a suggestion that community prosecution be defined to
exclude punitive strategies and thereby avoid the possibility of
disproportionately harsh punishment.7 8 Community prosecuting, as
so limited, would focus on quality-of-life offenses and would seek to
prevent or deter them through strategies other than prosecution,
such as neighborhood watches, cameras, and brighter lighting.7 9
The problem, of course, is that the response defines "prosecution"
out of the concept of "community prosecution" by excluding
strategies that include the use of traditional prosecutorial charging
power. The second response was that inequities could be avoided by
making community prosecuting strategies universal-that is, by
applying them throughout the prosecutor's jurisdiction rather than
targeting them to particular communities.80 This approach, in the
name of equal treatment, eliminates the distinctive focus on
"community" and results in extending policies to segments of the
jurisdiction where they are unjustified. For example, the Delaware
County prosecutor might avoid unequal treatment by denying lowlevel drug offenders access to the state's rehabilitation program
whether they were arrested in or out of Chester, but the result
would be to deprive everyone access to a program that the state
designed for them and that results in more proportionate disposition
in order to promote a social good that relates to only some of their
situations.
An alternative answer is that the social good achieved by thd
community prosecuting policy justifies disproportionate or unequal
treatment of some offenders. Just as a mob hit man who testifies
against his confederates may be treated different and more leniently
than other hit men to promote the criminal justice objective of

77. Others have as well.

See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Community

Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465, 1474 (2002) (noting that pilot community
prosecution programs "raise[d] issues of priority and proportionality in

prosecution"); Kelley Bowden Gray, Community Prosecution:After Two Decades,
Still New Frontiers, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 205-09 (2008) (discussing various
ethical concerns regarding community prosecution, including "that similarly
situated defendants may not be treated equally").
78. FROM THE COURTROOM TO THE COMMUNITY, supra note 31, at 8-9.
79. The APRI explains that defendants may be singled out for deterrence
but not for disproportionate treatment. Id. at 8. The aim is to "reduce an
impediment to livability" by focusing on low-level criminal conduct through
policing, not punishment.
Id.
Prosecutors prevent crime through
"[n]eighborhood clean-ups, formation of block watches and foot patrols, and
turning porch lights on at night .... [T]here is no focus on criminal convictions
at all, and offenders in the neighborhood therefore cannot be treated more
harshly than their counterparts in the conventional prosecution scenario." Id.
at 9.

80. Id. at 10 ("Chief prosecutors can avoid [the failure to treat like cases
alike] by expanding their community prosecution initiative jurisdiction-wide.").
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punishing other offenders, one might argue that low-level drug
offenders can be treated more harshly than would ordinarily be
expected (though still within the limits prescribed by law) in order
to serve criminal justice objectives or other worthy social ends. The
problem, however, is that the particular policy may not in fact serve
the intended objectives and, indeed, may be counterproductive.
When a prosecutor violates conventional principles governing the
exercise of discretion to serve what the prosecutor regards as the
greater good of the community, there is no particular reason to
assume that the prosecutor has exercised discretion fairly and
prudently-just the contrary. And with the benefit of hindsight,
many would now say that harsh drug-prosecution policies like the
one adopted in Chester proved unsuccessful.
III. THE COMMUNITY'S INFLUENCE ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
The story of the Delaware County prosecutor is not meant as an
examination of all the issues of prosecutorial discretion that might
arise in the context of community prosecuting. It is meant simply to
illustrate a point that may be intuitively obvious, namely, that some
community prosecution strategies may entail an unwise use of
prosecutorial power. If obvious, this should nonetheless warrant
concern for at least two reasons. The first is that community
prosecution strategies are relatively new for prosecutors and are
Traditional principles
departures from their ordinary work.
governing the exercise of decision-making authority may not be a
good fit. But guidance on the wise use of the new strategies has not
yet developed.s 1 The second reason for concern is that community
prosecuting entails an expansion of the prosecution's power and role.
Even in traditional criminal cases, the prudent exercise of
prosecutorial discretion is essential in light of the enormity of the
power that prosecutors wield for criminal law enforcement ends. 82
Community prosecuting potentially gives prosecutors access to
additional powers arising out of their collaborations with civil
government agencies and community institutions, and potentially
involves serving public objectives aside from traditional law
enforcement objectives. Expanded power and expanded jurisdiction
imply the ability to cause greater harm and, therefore, the need for

81. See What Have We Learned From Evaluations of Community
Prosecution?, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA
/evaluation/program-adjudication/comm-prosecution2.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2012) ("There has been some disagreement within the field regarding the goals
and objectives of prosecution generally and how to measure its
accomplishments.... [A]s of yet there have been no strong, systematic
evaluations undertaken to assess the performance of community prosecution
initiatives.").
82. Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor,14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259,
261 (2001).
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more careful attention to how discretionary decisions are made-for
example, in accordance with what norms and by what process.88
One might argue that a community prosecutor's cooperation
with and accountability to the affected community provide their own
checks on the prosecutor's discretionary decision making. After all,
scholars and commentators frequently call on prosecutors to employ
greater transparency and public accountability to improve the
exercise of traditional prosecutorial discretion, 84 and community
prosecution is founded on principles of transparency and
accountability. In the community policing context, community
justice advocates have argued that community participation in the
identification of problems and the development of solutions helps
ensure that police discretion is unleashed to maximize social good.
For example, Dan Kahan and Tracy Meares have argued that courts
should permit greater police discretion for law enforcement
strategies that have been endorsed by minority-dominated
neighborhoods.8 5
In their view, members of the affected
communities are better situated "practically and morally" to strike
the balance between liberty and order in their own neighborhoods. 86
Similarly, Debra Livingston has argued in favor of extrajudicial,
community-based checks on police discretion, such as civilian
oversight boards.8 7
Because community prosecutors, unlike
traditional prosecutors, exercise discretion outside their insular
offices, in view of the community to which they are accountable, we
might be less concerned about the risks of discretionary decision
making by community-based prosecutors than traditional
prosecutors.
But to rely on community participation as a means of improving
prosecutorial discretion is to assume that the community is

83. Cf. Robert Jackson, The FederalProsecutor,24 J. Am. JUDICATURE SoC'Y
18, 18-20 (1940) (encouraging prosecutors to use their discretion in an ethical
and moral manner).
84. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 3-16, 176-77 (2007); Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions:
The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 How. L.J. 475, 494 (2006); Stephanos

Bibas, Transparency and Participationin Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 917 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple

Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIs. L. REV. 291, 391;
Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 177-78 (2004).
85. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1166-71 (1998); Tracey L. Meares,
Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 410 (2000).
86. Kahan & Meares, supranote 85, at 1177-80.
87. Livingston, supra note 6, at 664-65; see also Reenah L. Kim,

Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policing: The Need for Democratically
Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 476-82 (2001) (summarizing arguments that community
partnerships serve as police oversight).
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sufficiently democratic, informed, and powerful to ensure that
community prosecution policies serve the community interest, but
not so powerful as to override other prosecutorial priorities.
Without participation by representative, well-informed, and
empowered stakeholders, there is a risk that law enforcement may
co-opt the politically popular rhetoric of "community," simply to
advance its own agenda.8 8
At the same time, trusting the
community to oversee the exercise of prosecutorial discretion creates
a risk that community-based voices will co-opt prosecutorial values.
The remainder of this Part examines these dual concerns and then
turns to the potential of community-based defense lawyers to help
foster a different kind of partnership between communities and law
enforcement.
Co-Opting of Communities
Just as the term "community prosecution" is difficult to define,
so is the very notion of "community."89 Out of a recognition that
crime and disorder tend to vary by neighborhood, community justice
programs tend to define community by geographic boundaries. 90
suggests
However, any meaningful idea of community
commonalities among its members that go beyond physical
proximity. 9 ' Because of the significant exit costs to residential
relocation, one's address may not be a valid indication of voluntary
membership in a geographically defined community. 92 Although
one's neighborhood may be a predictor of socioeconomic status or
race, defining community geographically can mask the significant
divisions that exist in a neighborhood, both among and within
identifiable groups, especially about law enforcement. 93 To say that

A.

88. See Kim, supranote 87, at 462.
89. JEROME E. McELROY ET AL., COMMUNITY POLICING: THE CPOP IN NEW
YORK 3-4 (1993) (noting that the term community is "imprecise" and can be
"idealized").

90. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
91. JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 254 (1993) (noting that communities are rare if defined

as having "a commonality of interests, traditions, identities, values, and
expectations"); McELROY, supra note 89 ("Virtually all commentators agree that
the concept of 'community' as used in the rhetoric of community policing is
imprecise ... and largely uninformed by a century of sociological usage and
study.").
92.

See EDWARD GLENN GOETZ, CLEARING THE WAY: DECONCENTRATING THE

POOR IN URBAN AMERICA 71, 86-87 (2003) (identifying expenses as significant

barriers to voluntary relocation).
93. See Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a
Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770-71 (1992); David Cole,
Foreword: Discretion and DiscriminationReconsidered:A Response to the New
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1085 (1999) ("[I]nner-city
communities, like all communities, do not speak with one voice .. . ."); Tracey L.
Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 689 (1998); Eric K.
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a community endorses law enforcement's efforts assumes that
divergent constituencies within a neighborhood can agree. 94
Moreover, even if the residents of a neighborhood could reach
something resembling a consensus in identifying and responding to
local crime and disorder, police and prosecutors may not be well
situated to assess that consensus. Involvement in community
justice programs is typically by only a small, nonrepresentative
segment of the population.9 5
Organizational and institutional
stakeholders might be businesses, churches, and other "issueoriented" groups with their own narrow agendas.9 6 For example,
Multnomah County's Neighborhood District Attorney Program,
commonly seen as a leader in the growth of community prosecution,
was formed in response to business leaders who were concerned that
local disorder would interfere with the growth of an emerging
commercial district. 97
More than twenty years later, local
businesses continue to provide partial funding of the program.9 8 As
for individual stakeholders, the neighborhood associations that
community justice programs often look to for residential
participation tend to be dominated by older, whiter, and more
fearful homeowners. 99 Other community members might be chilled
from participation based on distrust of law enforcement or simply
because they are too busy. One study of eight early community
Yamamoto, The Color Fault Lines: Asian American Justice from 2000, 8

ASIAN

L.J. 153, 157-58 (2001) (discussing "color on color" conflicts).

94. Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 359, 402 (2005) ("[C]riminal justice policies are largely imposed on
underrepresented inner city communities by middle-class politicians and
citizens who may have a radically different experience of crime and law
enforcement.").
95. See Burke, supranote 8, at 1006-07; Kim, supra note 87, at 482.
96. Kim, supra note 87, at 483.
97. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, COMMUNITY
PROSECUTION STRATEGIES: MEASURING IMPACT 2 (2002) ("The immediate origins

of the community prosecution movement are often traced to the pioneering
efforts of Multnomah County District Attorney (DA) Michael Schrunk, who
established the Neighborhood DA Unit in Portland, Oregon, in 1990 in response
to business leaders' concerns that quality-of-life crimes would impede
development of a central business district.").
98. Neighborhood DA
Unit,
OFFICE
OF
THE
DIST.
ATT'Y,
http://www2.co.multnomah.or.us/cfm/da/NDAP/index.cfm?fuseaction=overview
&menu=l (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (noting financial support from federal and
local government, the local transportation agency, and local businesses).

99. See Michael E. Buerger, A Tale of Two Targets: Limitations of
Community Anticrime Actions, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 137,
137-38 (David R. Karp ed., 1998); Wesley G. Skogan, Community Organizations
and Crime, in 10 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 39, 68 (Michael
Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1988) (concluding that residents are more likely to
organize in "homogeneous, better-off areas of cities"). But see WESLEY G.
SKOGAN, POLICE AND COMMUNITY IN CHICAGO: A TALE OF THREE CITIES 137 (2006)

(reporting that participation in Chicago community policing programs "was
highest in the city's most violent, drug-infested neighborhoods").
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justice programs concluded that, despite the varied approaches the
programs took to spur community involvement, only a "small core
group of residents" was involved, while "ordinary" residents had no
idea about, or only a vague awareness of, the programs operating in
their neighborhoods. 100
Even the most active community members may not have
sufficient information to assess the desirability of community-based
law enforcement programs. Consider, for example, the Delaware
County community prosecutor's policy designating Chester as a
drug-selling zone, where all drug offenses would be prosecuted.
Predictably, the policy would lead to a shift in police resources to
Chester, where the prosecutor had determined to treat drug offenses
more seriously. Residents seeking safer streets through more law
enforcement might initially support such a program. However, in
the long term, one could expect the policy to fall disproportionately
on residents of Chester, who spent much more of their time in the
targeted community, rather than on white out-of-towners who
occasionally drove into the city to buy drugs. Recreational drug
users in suburban and rural parts of the county who kept out of
Chester would largely be left alone, while young men and women of
color who were found in possession of drugs would be prosecuted
and convicted. This would lead in Chester to the problem that
Michelle Alexander calls "the new Jim Crow"10 1 : the mass
incarceration and relegation to second-class status of people
(especially men) of color who were prosecuted for nonviolent drug
offenses that are almost entirely ignored in middle-class white
It is hard to imagine that, if the long-term
communities.
consequences of the prosecutor's zero-tolerance drug policy were
described to Chester residents in 1990, it would be particularly
welcome.
Similarly, to the extent that community justice programs often
seek to improve the quality of life in neighborhoods by targeting the
enforcement of low-level offenses, residents who might otherwise be
wary of aggressive policing might endorse the programs on the
assumption that low-level offenses do not trigger serious punitive
consequences. However, they may do so without understanding
fully how the cases would otherwise be treated without their input,
how the programs work, or how the collateral consequences of the
programs they are supporting might affect their community and its
members. They may not, for example, consider the possibility that
cooperative
might undermine
policing
street
aggressive
relationships between the community and law enforcement in the
100. Randolph M. Grinc, 'Angels in Marble"- Problems in Stimulating
Community Involvement in Community Policing, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 437, 44245 (1994).
101. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 11-17 (rev. ed. 2012).
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long term.10 2
They may not know that the most minor
misdemeanors can trigger not only informal policing of social norms,
but also a full-blown custodial arrest.103 They may not know that
the government is permitted to hold a person who is arrested
without a warrant for up to forty-eight hours without a probable
cause hearing. 104 They may not realize that police can use minor
offenses as a pretextual basis for making an arrest.105 They may not
understand that the search that is permitted incident to such
arrestS106 might yield drugs or guns that result in felony convictions
and lengthy sentences, leaving members of the community with
whom they share a "linked fate" 0 7 out of the neighborhood, away
from their children, and with a criminal history that undermines
their ability to participate in society. Although the prosecutor, as an
attorney, will have such knowledge, there is no guarantee that
prosecutors will fully inform the community about consequences of
the program that might provoke public concern.
Finally, the community may not be in a position to identify or to
fight for alternative solutions to neighborhood problems beyond the
strategies proposed by law enforcement. 0 8 They may not realize, for
example, that criminal cases can be resolved through diversion
programs that enable defendants to avoid criminal convictions.
They may not know about nuisance law, property maintenance
codes, or other civil approaches to regulating neighborhood disorder
102. Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal
Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1219, 1227 (2000) ("Community tension with and distrust of police may

rise with more aggressive policing of low-level offenses."); Debra Livingston,
Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism about Police Patrol,1999 SUP. CT.
REV. 141, 178 ("[E]ven when properly employed, aggressive use of stop and frisk
can alienate and estrange communities in ways that ultimately detract from,
rather than contribute to, the maintenance of a vibrant civil order.").
103. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (holding that a custodial
arrest for a misdemeanor was valid even when the state legislature had
designated the crime a non-arrestable crime); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that a custodial arrest for a seatbelt offense was
lawful, even though the maximum penalty was a fine, not imprisonment,
because the offense was designated a crime by the legislature).
104. City of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
105. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816-19 (1996) (upholding
police seizure of a driver who had committed a minor traffic offense and holding
that the officer's subjective intentions for the seizure were immaterial).

106. See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
107. Tracey L. Meares, Social Organizationand Drug Law Enforcement, 35
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 215-17 (1998) (discussing the concept of "linked fate,"
both in people generally as they consider how government policies affect family
and friends, and specifically by African Americans, who feel a connection even
to Black strangers because of shared circumstances that have been shaped
historically by race).
108. See Grinc, supranote 100, at 456 (reporting that even the neighborhood
group leaders who were most knowledgeable about community justice programs
did not understand the community's role in them).
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and other concerns. If the prosecutor fails to identify alternative
approaches to problem solving, the community might support a
program proposed by law enforcement as the best of the known
alternatives. Although a well-intentioned community prosecutor
presumably shares the community's interest in devising the most
effective response, she is also accountable to her office and to the
government and must therefore be mindful of internal concerns.
The community, in contrast, might prefer far more expensive
strategies than the larger jurisdiction to whom the prosecutor is
ultimately accountable is willing to pay for.'0 9
If neighborhood involvement in community prosecution
programs is not truly representative of the relevant community and
is not sufficiently informed or empowered, the rhetoric of community
can be co-opted by law enforcement to advance its own objectives." 0
Some of the leading scholars of criminal procedure have warned
against the over lifting of the powerful and popular rhetorical
banner of "community." Professors Albert Alschuler and Stephen
Schulhofer, for example, once observed a need "to be on guard
against the appealing but highly manipulable rhetoric of
'community,' a rhetoric that is increasingly prevalent in
contemporary discourse.""' Debra Livingston has noted "that a
bewildering and sometimes inappropriate variety of police
initiatives could well be implemented in community policing's
name."11 2 Paul Chevigny has said, "So-called community policing
that does not mean participation by the people isn't really
community policing."113 And Robert Weisberg has cautioned that a
"somewhat sentimental notion of 'community"' can sometimes
conceal "a dangerously majoritarian anti- Constitutionalism."114
109. Cole, supra note 93, at 1088 (observing that inner-city residents might
prefer expensive alternatives that the larger community is unwilling to pay for);
Erik G. Luna, The Models of CriminalProcedure,2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 453
(1999) ("Inner-city minorities have opted for discretionary policing techniques
not on the merits but because society at large refuses to provide adequate
resources to safeguard urban communities.").
110. See Mastrofski & Willis, supra note 10, at 113 (citing WILLIAM LYONS,
THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY POLICING: REARRANGING THE POWER TO PUNISH

(1999)) (noting that a study of community policing programs in Seattle
concluded that, despite early progress in developing "participatory and
deliberative democracy," the programs ultimately became "less a two-way
communications mechanism than a means to garner community acquiescence to
police priorities and acceptance of police-generated programs").
111. Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Proceduresor
Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 215, 216 (1998).
112. Livingston, supra note 6, at 577.

113. Roundtable, Law and Disorder: Is Effective Law Enforcement
Inconsistent with Good Police-Community Relations?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
363, 366 (2000) (comments of Paul Chevigny).

114. Robert Weisberg, Foreword: A New Agenda for Criminal Procedure, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 367, 370 (1999).
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Without assurances that an affected community is actually
represented, informed, and empowered, community participation
and oversight may not serve as an effective check on prosecutorial
discretion.

B.

Co-Optingof ProsecutorialValues

At the same time that we may worry about prosecutors who
might advance an agenda driven entirely by law enforcement, but in
the name of community, community prosecution also poses the
opposing concern that majoritarian will might override prosecutorial
values.115 A prosecutor's well-known duty is not simply to punish,
but to promote justice. 116 In the interest of justice, prosecutors
generally prioritize serious offenses over minor ones, seeking
punishment that fits the severity of the crime.117 As a general
matter, they also seek to have similarly situated offenders treated
equally.118
In contrast, a neighborhood overridden by low-level crime and
disorder does not approach crime-related problems like lawyers, let
alone like prosecutors. Community members may overestimate the
comparative severity of their concerns, failing to prioritize local
problems in light of overall jurisdictional needs. They might also
demand differential treatment of the offenders who are
deteriorating the quality of life in their communities as compared to
offenders in another location. A public afraid of crime is known to
respond by asking for more policing and more punishment, failing to
recognize criminal law's traditional retributive limits to utilitarianbased punishment.11 9

115. Lanni, supra note 94, at 369-70.
116. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2009); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13
(1980); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 64, § 3-1.2(c).
117. Devin J. Doolan, Jr., Community Prosecution:A Revolution in Crime
Fighting,51 CATH. U. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (2002).
118. Gray, supra note 77, at 206.
119. Susan A. Bandes, Child Rape, Moral Outrage, and the Death Penalty,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 17, 21 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu
/lawreview/colloquy/2008/27/lrcoll2008n27bandes.pdf (noting the connection
between fear and the public's retributive impulses); Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie

S. Fisher & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion about Punishment and
Corrections, in 27 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael Tonry
ed., 2000) (assessing public opinion about punishment); cf. Thompson, supra
note 4, at 348, 353-54 ("Some might contend that placing too much emphasis on
community sentiment could undermine the detachment the prosecutor needs in
order to exercise discretion and fulfill the role of minister of justice.... [A]ny
design of a community program must take into account the delicate balance
between appropriate respect for and cooperation with the community on the one
hand and the risk of ceding undue control to (or simply being perceived as
having ceded undue control) to community members on the other.").
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The Delaware County prosecutor's decision to prosecute all drug
offenses committed in Chester can be considered through this lens.
Vocal business owners, churches, and residents-tired of operating,
worshipping, and living in the middle of the county's drug districtmay have demanded action. The designation of a zero-tolerance
zone would be a quick, clear, and highly visible reaction to crime
Community prosecution is intended to promote
concerns. 120
consideration and implementation of alternatives to traditional
punishment. But when vocal and empowered communities demand
more law enforcement, their participation might lead to more
unleashing of punishment, not less, if the prosecutor is unable or
unwilling to shape or resist community sentiment.
C.

Leveling the PlayingField: Community Defense Lawyers

The movement of prosecutors out of the courthouse and into
local neighborhoods poses special concerns about the exercise of
In developing
discretion by community-based prosecutors.
community prosecution strategies, prosecutors may employ
processes that compensate for the absence of well-developed
normative understandings: the involvement of the community, other
agencies, and others in the formulation of community prosecution
strategies may help prevent policies that are unproductive or
counterproductive and unfair. Although the transparency and
accountability on which this model of prosecution is premised
provide some theoretical promise of guiding discretion, 121 the
community's potential to oversee prosecutorial decision making can
be undermined if participation in prosecutorial programs is not
sufficiently representative of all affected constituencies or if the
community is not sufficiently knowledgeable or empowered to serve
120. The rhetoric of "zero tolerance" has been traced to Ronald Reagan's
escalation of the war on drugs. See DIANA R. GORDON, THE RETURN OF THE
DANGEROUS CLASSES: DRUG PROHIBITION AND POLICY POLITICS 199 (1994);
ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE PUBLIC
AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE WAR ON DRUGS 55-63 (2009). Since then, policy

makers have adopted "zero tolerance" policies in response to a broad array of
public concerns. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE
PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 2 (2001) (street crime and minor
offenses); J. Richard Chema, Arresting 'Tailhook" The Prosecution of Sexual
Harassment in the Military, 140 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1993) (sexual harassment in the

military following the highly publicized Tailhook scandal); Fairfax, supra note
69, at 1258 n.56 (domestic violence); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the

Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School
Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 1067, 1069
(2003) (school violence); Cara Suvall, Restorative Justice in Schools: Learning
from Jena High School, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 551 (2009) ("[Z]ero

tolerance policies have expanded to include a wider range of student behavior
including other violence, bullying, threatening, use of profanity, alcohol or
tobacco consumption, and other offenses.").
121. See supra note 84.
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as a meaningful counterbalance. At the same time, politically
powerful contingents of the community may have the potential to coopt prosecutorial values such as proportionality and equality.
One purpose of community prosecution is to bring a lawyer's
expertise to community justice efforts, demonstrating an
understanding that lawyers are important to the process.1 22 But
prosecutors are not general practitioners. They have expertise in
criminal law and from a prosecutorial perspective. They tend to be
isolated within their own profession, rarely participating in bar
Community
activities or engaging with other lawyers.123
prosecution often calls on them to apply nonadvocacy, "social work"
types of skills that they may not have and may even be hostile
If the goal of community justice is to address
toward.124
neighborhood concerns outside the narrow approach of the usual
rapid-response model of policing and prosecution, it is not obvious
why the only legal expertise is being provided by prosecutors. When
we shift to community prosecution, there is a missing voice that is
equally informed in law. Defense lawyers may be in a better
position to draw on the perspective of a clientele of people who
commit crimes and are accused of doing so. Defense lawyers can
identify other "stakeholders" who may not be part of the community
They can also provide citizen
prosecution advisory circle.
participants with another perspective of the programs in question.
The defense lawyer's perspective might help prosecutors temper
their impulse to resort to traditional prosecution methods.
Consider, as a contrast to Delaware County's drug-free zone
policy, what has become known as the "High Point" model of
intervention in the drug trade, shaped by Professor David Kennedy's
efforts in High Point, North Carolina.125 Kennedy describes the
initiative as follows:

122. GOLDKAMP ET AL., supra note 97, at 7 ("[C]ommunity prosecutors can
offer the legal expertise and authority to bring creative community policing
solutions to fruition.").
123. The Effect of State Ethics Rules on Federal Law Enforcement: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the

Judiciary, 106th Cong. 53 (1999) (testimony of John Smietanka, former
prosecutor) (stating that "[t]ime, money and, to some unfortunate extent, a
cultural chasm" prevent prosecutors from "meaningful participation" in bar

activities); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor:A Conceptual
Framework, 15 Am. J. CRiM. L. 197, 208 (1988) (noting that prosecutors tend to

be isolated from groups who might encourage empathy for defendants, while
surrounded by populations "who can graphically establish that the defendant
deserves punishment, and who have no reason to be concerned with competing
values of justice").
124. See Levine, supra note 34, at 1173-74 (documenting prosecutorial
wariness of the "social work components" of California's community-based
Statutory Rape Vertical Prosecution Program).
125. See David Kennedy, Drugs, Race and Common Ground: Reflections on
the High PointIntervention, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., March 2009, at 12 (2009).
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A particular drug market is identified; violent dealers are
arrested; and nonviolent dealers are brought to a "call-in"
where they face a roomful of law enforcement officers, social
service providers, community figures, ex-offenders and
"influentials"-parents, relatives and others with close,
important relationships with particular dealers. The drug
dealers are told that (1) they are valuable to the community,
and (2) the dealing must stop. They are offered social services.
They are informed that local law enforcement has worked up
cases on them, but that these cases will be "banked"
(temporarily suspended). Then they are given an ultimatum:
to deal, the banked cases against you will be
if you continue
126
activated.
In developing the model, Kennedy encountered deeply held
beliefs on the part of both law enforcement and community residents
that threatened to undermine cooperation between the two. Law
enforcement believed that the community lacked positive social
norms and was apathetic or even supportive of drug dealing and its
accompanying violence. 127 Residents, on the other hand, believed
that the police were part of a conspiracy to destroy their
community.128 To get through a "brick wall that preclude[d]
meaningful conversations," Kennedy had to engage in "blunt
conversations" with both sides, asking police to understand why
residents saw them as the enemy and asking residents if they had
done enough to express positive expectations of their own friends
and family members. 129 Importantly, in this model, the message to
offenders that their drug activity must stop comes not only from
police and prosecutors, but also from the community itself.130 And
because the government has agreed to "bank" potential charges,
community members who might otherwise be wary of criminal
punishment are willing to engage in partnerships with law
enforcement and to accept the charges that do result for offenders
who fail to heed the community's pleas for change. 3 1
The High Point model demonstrates the broad array of
discretion left to the prosecutor seeking to develop community
prosecution strategies, the lack of any single ideal process, and the
host of questions that might be raised. For example, in seeking to
develop community prosecution strategies, what information should
be sought and from whom? Should the prosecutor speak only with
business leaders, clergy, and educators? Or should the prosecutor
also speak with the very population whose activities are at the heart
of the community's concerns? To what extent should prosecutors
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

12-13.
13.
15.
12-13.
16.
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look beyond community representatives and government agenciesthat is, to social scientists, health care professionals, social workers,
and others who might offer different perspectives? What should
community prosecutors do with the information they gather? When
should prosecutors promote community objectives and when should
they serve as a check on community sentiment?
Prosecutors may not be in a position on their own to either
identify all of the relevant stakeholders or to explore all of the
divergent outlooks on a community problem. Criminal defense
lawyers, who have access to prior clients and their families, and who
may generally hold a contrasting worldview from prosecutors, can
bring lawyering skills to community justice efforts from a different
perspective.
IV. TRANSPARENCY AND TRADITIONAL PROSECUTION

We have posited that the public's ability to serve as a check on
prosecutorial discretion in the community prosecution context will
depend on whether a diversely constituted community is fully
participatory in prosecution efforts, and whether the public is
sufficiently informed and empowered to meaningfully express its
will. At the same time, however, we have expressed an opposing
concern that an overly empowered public can impose majoritarian
will and override traditional prosecutorial values, such as treating
similarly situated offenders equally or prioritizing more serious
offenses. We have suggested that the addition of defense lawyers to
community justice conversations might increase community
participation and education, while also tempering prosecutorial
impulses toward traditional law enforcement methods.
We close by considering whether the lessons of community
prosecution might be imported into other areas of traditional
discretion. As currently implemented, community prosecution takes
place on a separate track from traditional prosecution, practiced by
different lawyers and reflecting different models of law
enforcement.132
Prosecutors who favor community-based
prosecution have failed to articulate why the model's tenets should
not apply more broadly to all prosecutorial action.133
if

132. See Lanni, supra note 94, at 362 ("The result [of community justice
programs] is a two-tiered system in which minor and serious crimes are
addressed through separate procedures with entirely different assumptions
about what crime is and what punishment ought to accomplish."); Levine, supra
note 34, at 1173-74 (noting culture divide between traditional and communitybased prosecutors).
133. See Lanni, supra note 94, at 362-63 ("There is . .. a plausible rationale
for diverting minor offenders from the traditional criminal justice process . ...
But if the community justice movement aims to enhance the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system as a whole by fostering popular participation and
making law enforcement responsive to local community needs, community
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transparency, public accountability, and an exploration of
nonpunitive responses to crime are sensible in developing proactive
law enforcement strategies, the obvious question is why these same
principles should not apply to traditional prosecutorial work that is
reactive to individual criminal offenses.134
One possible argument for separating "new" prosecution from
"traditional" prosecution might hinge on a distinction between the
minor, quality-of-life offenses that tend to be the subject of
community prosecution and the serious crimes that almost
universally trigger traditional prosecution. One might argue that,
from a retributive perspective, serious offenses demand a minimum
level of punishment. Therefore, it is improper for society to explore
alternative, nonpunitive responses to these crimes. In contrast,
quality-of-life offenses are less wrong and, in some instances, are
criminalized only as a means to an end of maximizing social good.
Retribution calls for little or no punishment for these offenses.
Accordingly, law enforcement may adopt an instrumentalist
approach, seeking the most effective, responsive strategy, without
offending society's retributive notions of justice. Reliance on a
utilitarian model of punishment for minor offenses, while invoking
retributive justifications for serious ones, would concede (and
justify) a two-tiered system. 3 5
However, the distinction between minor ("new") and serious
("traditional") offenses, and an accompanying differentiation
between consequentialist and desert-based schools of punishment,
does not explain why public participation, transparency, and
accountability are appropriate for the former, but not the latter.
While half of all prosecutors' offices practice some form of
community prosecution,136 prosecutors' offices are still widely seen
as insular, reluctant to relinquish their broad discretion, and
Community
resistant to calls for increased transparency.13 7
justice initiatives must address the crimes that make up the mainstream
criminal docket.").
134. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 361 ("Those informed by a vision of

community prosecution believe that prosecutors should make regular efforts to
learn from those they serve, to explain choices they may be considering or find
themselves pursuing, and to hold themselves more transparently accountable
for their policies, decisions, and record.").
135. This two-tiered system might be seen as an application of Norval
Morris's philosophy of limiting retribution, which provides that the principle of
just deserts should define the outer limits of an offense's punishment, but that
society may pursue utilitarian objectives within the permissible range. See
generally NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73-75 (1974); NORvAL
MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 199 (1982); NORvAL MORRIS &
MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS
IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 84 (1990). The authors thank David Yellen

for this point.
136. History of Community Prosecution,supra note 1.
137. See Bibas, supra note 84, at 911.
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prosecutors may leave the courthouse to engage with outside voices,
but much of what the traditional prosecutor does takes place not
only at the courthouse, but also off the record, unseen, and
unseeable from public view.138
Consider again, for example, the Delaware County prosecutor's
response to drug activity in the City of Chester. Community input
might assist the prosecutor in determining whether low-level drug
transactions should be considered minor enough to qualify for "new"
models of prosecution (and what those models should look like), or
whether they are sufficiently harmful to justify retribution-based
Or if this decision is left entirely within the
punishment.
prosecutor's discretion, perhaps the public should be informed about
the adoption of a two-tiered system and the factors that guide the
prosecutor's determination about which types of cases are treated as
"new" and which will be treated "traditionally."
Moreover, traditional prosecution-even applying reactive,
retributive models of punishment-might benefit from engagement
As scholars have
with voices outside the prosecutor's office.
previously noted, prosecutorial transparency increases public
confidence in prosecutors and courts and enhances the legitimacy of
the criminal justice system.13 9 Public elections of prosecutors would
be more reliable if the public were better informed about
prosecutorial policies and discretionary decision making.140
Prosecutors might also be able to neutralize the kinds of cognitive
biases that can result in wrongful convictions by talking about their
cases with people-perhaps even defense attorneys-who might see
41
the evidence or the offense in a different light.1
At the same time, in the context of much of prosecutors'
traditional work-namely, the prosecution of individual casesthere are practical and ethical limits on the ability to make decision
input.
to community
and respond
making transparent
Discretionary decision making is pervasive;142 prosecutors would not
138. See Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1256-58; Medwed, supra note 84, at 17778; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors,89 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 18 (2009).
139. DAVIS, supra note 84, at 176-77; Bibas, supra note 84, at 949; Ronald F.
Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors,
67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1589 (2010).
140. Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the
Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors,46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 334, 336 (2002);
Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: StipulatingAway Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 963 (1997); Ronald F. Wright, How
ProsecutorElections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 583 (2009).
141. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1621 (2006); Findley
& Scott, supra note 84, at 391.
142. Green & Zacharias, supra note 36, at 840-41, 902 ("Discretion pervades
every aspect of [prosecutors'] work, including investigations, charging and plea
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have time to become transparent and accountable in every
individual case even if it were desirable and proper to do so.
Prosecutors are limited by the interests in investigative secrecy and
in fairness to the accused in their ability to discuss publicly the facts
relevant to charging decisions and other discretionary decisions or
The Manhattan District
the reasons for their decisions. 143
Attorney's recent, highly publicized prosecution of Dominique
Strauss-Kahn was a rare one in which the prosecutor had an
opportunity, in the context of judicial proceedings, to explain the
facts and standards governing a discretionary decision-in that
case, the decision to seek to dismiss previously filed charges. 144 In
contrast, if the Manhattan prosecutor had decided not to bring
charges in the first place and had issued a public statement
explaining why, the prosecutor might have been criticized for being
unfair both to the alleged accuser, whose credibility was called into
question, and to the accused, who remained under a cloud of
suspicion. Similarly, if the prosecutor had solicited community
input before deciding whether to bring or continue charges, the
prosecutor would have been criticized for abdicating his authority to
exercise independent professional judgment. Prosecutors might be
encouraged, based on the community prosecuting model, to develop
and publicly articulate general principles governing their traditional
work, 145 but it would be unrealistic to expect in their ad hoc, reactive
decision making the kind of transparency and community
engagement that is characteristic of the work of community
prosecuting.
CONCLUSION

This Article set out to explore the special problem of discretion
by the community prosecutor. We have suggested that the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion in developing community prosecution
strategies poses unique problems from traditional prosecution work.
One implication is that prosecutors ought to discuss and develop
bargaining, trials, sentencing, and responding to postconviction events.. . . The
practical realities of the criminal justice system, including the sheer volume of
cases that need to be disposed of, to a large extent require society to trust
prosecutors to make decisions in the right way and on the right grounds."
(citations omitted)).
143. Id. at 902 ("Prosecutors would be far less effective if their work were
transpaient. Full transparency might also compromise the safety and privacy
of agents, witnesses, and others.").
144. Recommendation for Dismissal, supra note 63, at 1-3.
145. Green & Zacharias, supra note 36, at 903 ("Prosecutors' limited public
accountability might be acceptable, or at least more acceptable, if there were
well-established normative standards governing prosecutors' discretionary
decision-making.... [There is] a need for deeper thinking by prosecutors and
for a public articulation of clearer first- and second-order principles that can
guide prosecutors' decisions.").
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normative understandings regarding the use of proactive strategies
and policies of the kind that have been labeled as community
prosecuting. Another is that the public should be attentive to
community prosecuting strategies, should ask how they are
justified, and should evaluate the justifications with sufficient
information to serve a meaningful participatory function. And
finally, whatever lessons emerge about the relationship between the
public and prosecutorial discretion when prosecutors step out of the
courthouse might also, within limits, inform the proper exercise of
discretion within traditional prosecutorial functions.

